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Abstract
We consider the question of minimizing the round complexity of protocols for secure multiparty
computation (MPC) with security against an arbitrary number of semi-honest parties. Very recently,
Garg and Srinivasan (Eurocrypt 2018) and Benhamouda and Lin (Eurocrypt 2018) constructed such
2-round MPC protocols from minimal assumptions. This was done by showing a round preserving
reduction to the task of secure 2-party computation of the oblivious transfer functionality (OT).
These constructions made a novel non-black-box use of the underlying OT protocol. The question
remained whether this can be done by only making black-box use of 2-round OT. This is of theoretical
and potentially also practical value as black-box use of primitives tends to lead to more efficient
constructions.
Our main result proves that such a black-box construction is impossible, namely that non-black-
box use of OT is necessary. As a corollary, a similar separation holds when starting with any 2-party
functionality other than OT.
As a secondary contribution, we prove several additional results that further clarify the landscape
of black-box MPC with minimal interaction. In particular, we complement the separation from 2-
party functionalities by presenting a complete 4-party functionality, give evidence for the difficulty of
ruling out a complete 3-party functionality and for the difficulty of ruling out black-box constructions
of 3-round MPC from 2-round OT, and separate a relaxed “non-compact” variant of 2-party
homomorphic secret sharing from 2-round OT.
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1 Introduction
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows mutually distrusting parties to compute a
joint function f of their private inputs without revealing anything more than the output to
each other.
In this paper we consider the simplest setting for MPC with no honest majority, namely
MPC with an arbitrary number of corrupted parties. We focus on the semi-honest (aka
passive) security model, where corrupted parties follow the protocol but try to (jointly) learn
additional information on inputs of uncorrupted parties from the messages they observe. We
also assume that the parties can communicate over secure point-to-point channels and that
corruptions are non-adaptive (i.e., the set of corrupted parties is fixed before the protocol’s
execution). All of the above assumptions make negative results stronger.
The design and analysis of MPC protocols crucially rely on the notion of secure reductions.
In particular, classical completeness results [54, 34] have shown that the problem of securely
computing a general n-party functionality f efficiently reduces to the problem of securely
computing the elementary finite 2-party Oblivious Transfer (OT) functionality [51, 26].
(Similar results have been proven for active adversaries as well [44, 43].) Perhaps surprisingly,
for 2-party secure computation (2PC), Yao’s reduction is round preserving. That is, it incurs
no overhead in the round complexity. It additionally requires the parties to make a black-box
use of any pseudorandom generator (PRG).
I Theorem 1 (Round-optimal 2PC [54]). Every 2-party functionality g admits an MPC
protocol that only makes parallel calls to an OT oracle and a black-box use of a PRG.
In more detail, the OT functionality FOT involves two parties referred to as Receiver and
Sender. The functionality takes a bit x from the Receiver and a pair of bits (more generally,
strings) (m0,m1) from the Sender, and delivers to the Receiver the message mx. This is
done while hiding m1−x from the Receiver and hiding x from the Sender.
Yao’s reduction makes a single round of parallel calls to FOT.1 Using a suitable composition
theorem for MPC in the semi-honest model (see, e.g., [20, 33]), this can be securely replaced
by parallel invocations of any OT protocol, namely a secure 2-party protocol for FOT. The
1 If both parties should receive an output, the reduction uses parallel OTs in both directions, where each
party acts both as a Sender and as a Receiver.
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resulting construction of 2-party MPC from a 2-party OT protocol is black-box.2 This means
that the MPC protocol does not depend on the code of the underlying OT protocol, and
moreover the security proof is black-box in the sense that any adversary “breaking” the
MPC protocol can be used as a black-box to break the OT protocol. Instantiating with
one of several natural known 2-round OT protocols (whose existence follows from standard
intractability assumptions), we get a 2-round 2-party MPC protocol, which is clearly optimal.
Round Complexity in the Multiparty Setting. In contrast to the 2-party setting, progress
on the round complexity of general MPC has been slow and some of the questions still remain
unanswered. As already mentioned, the completeness of OT in the multiparty setting was
first established by Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson (GMW) [34]. However, their reduction
suffered from large round complexity (proportional to the circuit depth of the target function).
The question of achieving a constant-round protocol has been considered by Beaver, Micali,
and Rogaway [12], who extended Yao’s garbled circuit technique to the multiparty setting.
Combined with the GMW result, this yields a reduction to OT with constant overhead in
the round complexity.
I Theorem 2 (Constant-round MPC [34, 12]). Every n-party functionality admits a constant-
round protocol, making black-box use of a PRG, given an oracle access to FOT.
In more concrete terms, the most round-efficient current MPC protocol that makes a
black-box use of a 2-round OT protocol requires 4 rounds of interaction [1]. The above
results left a gap between the round complexity of 2PC and MPC protocols. In a recent
breakthrough, this gap was partially closed.
I Theorem 3 (2-round MPC from minimal assumption [31, 13]). Suppose a 2-round OT
protocol exists. Then every n-party functionality admits a 2-round MPC protocol.
The theorem settles the high-order bit about the minimal assumptions needed for 2-round
MPC by showing that 2-round OT is sufficient. (Being a special case of 2-round MPC, it is
clearly necessary.) However, quite surprisingly, the MPC protocol in these works inherently
makes use of the code of the underlying OT protocol. This situation is quite rare in the
context of MPC protocols and in cryptography in general (see Section 1.2), and it is not
clear whether this non-black-box use of OT is inherent. This calls for the following natural
question:
Is it possible to reduce general n-party MPC to a 2-party OT protocol in a round-
preserving black-box way? In particular, is there a black-box construction of 2-round
MPC from 2-round OT?
The above question is not only of a theoretical interest, but is also potentially relevant to
practice. Indeed, black-box use of cryptographic primitives tends to lead to more efficient
constructions. The goal of obtaining efficient 2-round MPC protocols is very well motivated,
since such protocols have qualitative advantages over similar protocols with a bigger number of
rounds. Indeed, in a 2-round MPC protocol, each party can send its first-round messages and
then go oﬄine until all second-round messages are received and the output can be computed.
Moreover, the first-round messages can be potentially reused for several computations in
which a party’s input remains unchanged. This is analogous to the qualitative advantage of
public-key encryption over interactive key agreement.
2 The notion of a black-box construction used in this paper (also referred to as a black-box reduction)
corresponds to the notion of a fully black-box reduction in the taxonomy of [52].
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In this paper, we will provide a negative answer to the above question, showing that
there is a real gap between the power of round-preserving black-box (RPBB) reductions and
round-preserving non-black-box reductions. Our findings also reveal a rich and somewhat
unexplored world of cryptographic protocols that use a minimal amount of interaction. We
will exhibit some of the black-box and non-black-box connections among these primitives
and relate them to standard ones.
1.1 Our Results
We now give a more detailed account of our results.
1.1.1 Separating 3-Party Functionalities from 2-Party Functionalities
Our first result shows that 2-round MPC protocols cannot be based on 2-round OT in a
black-box way. In fact, we show that even 3-party computation of fairly simple functionalities
is unachievable via black-box use of 2-round OT.
I Theorem 4 (Main Result). There exists a 3-party functionality f that cannot be securely
computed by a 2-round protocol with black-box use of 2-round OT.
We note that we do not just rule out round-preserving reductions to the ideal-OT
functionality, but rather rule out all such black-box constructions from an OT protocol.
(Indeed, much of the technical work is devoted to coping with the latter model; see Section 2.)
Moreover, the theorem holds even for constructions in the private-channel setting (where
each pair of parties is connected via a private channel), and even when the parties have an
access to a public common reference string (CRS), and to a random oracle.
1.1.2 A Complete 4-Party Functionality
OT turns out to be incomplete for MPC under RPBB reductions. Given this state of affairs,
one may try to prove a completeness result for some other finite functionality. We show that
this is indeed possible. Specifically, let (3, 4)−MULTPlus denote the 4-party functionality
that takes a pair of bits (xi, zi) from each of the first three parties (and no input from the
fourth party) and delivers the value x1x2x3+z1+z2+z3 to all four parties where addition and
multiplication are over the binary field. We prove that (3, 4)−MULTPlus is MPC-complete
under RPBB reductions. (Related results have been proved in other settings [18, 28].) In
fact, we prove an “ideal-oracle” completeness result just like in Yao’s theorem.
I Theorem 5 (Round Optimal MPC from Finite Ideal Functionality). Every n-party function-
ality f can be realized using parallel calls to a (3, 4)−MULTPlus oracle and a black-box use
of a PRG.
It’s worth noting that (3, 4)−MULTPlus is related to the standard 2-party OT functionality.
In general, for d ≤ p, let (d, p)−MULTPlus denote the p-party functionality in which each




i zi is delivered
to all p parties. Then, standard 2-party OT is equivalent (under RPBB reductions) to
(2, 2)−MULTPlus.3
3 First observe that the receiver’s output in OT can be written as m0 + x(m1 −m0) where addition and
multiplication are over the binary field. Therefore, we can implement OT based on (2, 2)−MULTPlus by
letting the receiver (resp., sender) play the role of the first party (resp., second party) with inputs x1 = x
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1.1.3 The Land of Three-Party Functionalities
The finite (3, 4)−MULTPlus therefore stands at the entry point to the general MPC mainland.
Across the ocean, lies the island of two party functionalities (including the complete OT)
and one cannot cross it in a black-box round-preserving vessel. We move on and explore the
mysterious land of three party functionalities.
Given the incompleteness of 2-party functionalities and the completeness of four party
functionalities (under round-preserving BB reductions), it is natural to ask whether 3-party
functionalities are complete. We show that the answer to this question is related to a
well-known open problem in information-theoretic cryptography.
I Question 6 ([41]). Does every finite function admit a degree-2 statistical randomized
encoding?
A randomized encoding (RE) of a function [41, 6] f(x) is a randomized function fˆ(x; r) that,
in addition to the input x, takes an additional random input r. For any input x, the random
variable fˆ(x), induced by a random choice of r, should reveal the value of f(x) and hide
everything else. The power of REs stems from the fact that even complicated functions
can be encoded by simple encoding. In the context of MPC, it is known that every finite
function can be encoded by a function fˆ(x; r) that each of its outputs can be written as a
degree-3 polynomial over the indeterminates (x, r). While some negative results are known
for perfectly-private degree-2 encodings [41], the feasibility of statistically-private degree-2
encodings (that are allowed to have a small non-zero privacy error) has remained open for
almost 20 years. (See also the surveys [40, 3].) We relate this longstanding open problem to
the completeness of 3-party functionalities under RPBB reductions.
I Proposition 7. A positive answer to Question 6 implies that every n-party finite functional-
ity g can be realized using parallel calls to an oracle that implements the 3-party functionality
(2, 3)−MULTPlus.
The proposition implies that we cannot rule out the completeness of 3-party functionalities
without ruling out the existence of general degree-2 (statistical) randomized encoding. Similar
barriers have been established in the context of degree-2 cryptographic hash functions [5]. We
note that the completeness of (2, 3)−MULTPlus follows even from the existence of general
degree-2 fully-secure multiparty randomized encoding [4] – a seemingly weaker variant of RE
whose existence is also open. (See the discussion in [4].)
External output functionalities. The (2, 3) −MULTPlus is a special case of an external-
output 3-party functionality. Formally, let g(x, y) be a 2-party functionality. The external
version of g, is the 3-party functionality fg that takes x from Alice, y from Bob and delivers
g(x, y) to Alice and Bob, and to Carol who holds no input.4 Two-round protocols for
and a random bit z1 (resp., x2 = m1 −m0 and z2 = m0). The receiver gets the required output (by
subtracting z1 from the output of the (2, 2)−MULTPlus), and the sender learns noting (since it receives
a random bit). In the other direction, first observe that the one-sided variant of (2, 2) −MULTPlus,
where only the first party has to learn the value x1x2 + z1 + z2, is RPBB-reducible to OT. Indeed, let
player 1 (resp., player 2) play the role of the receiver (resp., sender) with inputs x = x1 (resp., m0 = z2
and m1 = z2+x2), and set the output of player 1 to be the output of the OT plus z1. Next, observe that
standard (2, 2)−MULTPlus can be constructed by making two parallel calls to the one-sided variant.
4 In fact, for all of our purposes, an even weaker version suffices. In this relaxed version, all parties are
allowed to learn the output (for purposes of privacy), but only Carol is required to learn it (for purposes
of correctness). Since this leads to a cumbersome definition, we stick to the simpler version described
above.
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such functionalities turn out to have interesting properties. Specifically, at the core of our
main impossibility result (Theorem 4), lies the following constructive theorem for external
functionalities.
I Theorem 8 (Conversion Theorem). Let g(x, y) be a 2-party functionality. The external
version of g is the 3-party functionality fg that takes x from Alice, y from Bob and delivers
g(x, y) to Alice and Bob, and to Carol who holds no input.
Suppose that the functionality fg can be securely computed in 2 rounds by making a
black-box use of 2-round OT over private channels. Then, fg can be securely implemented
over random inputs given only an access to a Random Oracle over private channels. Moreover,
in the resulting protocol Carol sends no message and so it yields a two-party protocol for
computing g over random inputs given only an access to a Random Oracle.
Haitner et al. [36] showed that any 2-party functionality that can be securely realized in the
Random Oracle (RO) model is trivial in the sense that it admits an unconditional 2-party
protocol over random inputs with security against computationally-unbounded adversaries.
As a corollary, we derive the following stronger version of Theorem 4.
I Corollary 9. Every external functionality fg that is based on a non-trivial 2-party func-
tionality f cannot be computed by a 2-round protocol that makes a black-box use of 2-round
OT even in the private-channel setting.
A notable example for such a non-trivial 2-party functionality is the AND functionality [21, 46].
Corollary 9 is tight in terms of round complexity. With one additional round, fg can
be black-box reduced to 2-round OT. (Specifically, one can use Yao’s theorem to pass the
value of f(x, y) to Alice and Bob in two rounds, and then exploit the additional round to
send this value to Carol.) The 2-party completeness of OT (Theorem 1) also implies that
Corollary 9 holds when the OT functionality is replaced by an arbitrary 2-party functionality
h(x, y). Overall, we get a separation between all 2-party functionalities and all external
functionalities fg whose underlying g is non-trivial.
Relation with homomorphic secret sharing. Two-round MPC for extended-output func-
tionalities can be seen as closely related to the problem of homomorphic secret sharing
(HSS) [16, 18]. HSS is the secret-sharing analogue of fully homomorphic encryption. A
(2-party) HSS scheme allows local computation of a function g(x, y) on independently shared
inputs x and y, where the output g(x, y) can be decoded from the pair of output shares. The
standard notions of HSS require either additive decoding over a group or, more generally, that
the output shares be compact in the sense that they are shorter than the inputs. A natural
variant is to replace compactness by the requirement that the pair of output shares give no
information except g(x, y), even from the point of view of one of the input holders. This
security requirement is easily obtained from additive HSS via a simple additive refreshing of
the output shares. This flavor of non-compact HSS easily implies (in a black-box way) a
2-round external output protocol for g (in the private-channel setting), which by Corollary 9
can be separated from 2-round OT. On the other hand, a non-black-box construction of
non-compact HSS from 2-round OT follows from [31, 28].
1.2 Discussion
In this section we give some further perspective on our results and some future research
directions which they motivate.
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1.2.1 Why is the multiparty setting different than the 2-party setting?
It is instructive to reconsider the round complexity of MPC in light of our results. Protocols
with low round complexity are based on two types of reductions.
1. A degree reduction that takes a general n-party functionality f and reduces it (via
RPBB reduction) to a degree-d functionality for a constant d. Specifically, the standard
machinery of randomized-encoding leads to degree 3. In the special case of two parties,
we can trivially reduce the degree down to 2, and so we get a degree reduction to
d = min(3, n).
2. A player reduction that takes an n-party functionality of degree d and reduces it to the
(d, p)–MULTPlus functionality. We show that p can be dropped down to d + 1 and, in
any case, it is no larger than n, leading to an expression of the form p = min(d + 1, n).
In the special case of two parties n = 2 we get an RPBB-reduction to (2, 2)–MULTPlus
which is equivalent to OT. For large n’s, this leads to the completeness of (3, 4)–MULTPlus
(Theorem 5). In order to prove that OT is complete (under RPBB-reductions) we have
to bypass two barriers: A Degree barrier (prove completeness of degree 2 functionalities)
and a Player reduction barrier (reducing the 3-party functionality (2,3)–MULTPlus to (2,2)–
MULTPlus). While the first barrier is well-known, the second one appears to be new to this
work. Clearly, both barriers are bypassed by non-black-box techniques (Theorem 3). We
show that this is inherent for the second “player reduction” barrier, and leave the possibility
of breaking the degree-barrier via RPBB-reduction open.
1.2.2 On the Role of Non-Black-Box Constructions in Cryptography
Our main result provides a very natural example of a pair of cryptographic primitives for
which a non-black-box construction of one from the other exists but a black-box construction
can be ruled out. Thus, our work further demonstrates the essential role of non-black-box
techniques in cryptography.
To give some historical perspective, following the seminal result of Impagliazzo and
Rudich [39] and subsequent works on black-box separations in cryptography [53, 32, 52], the
question of finding a pair of “natural” cryptographic primitives for which a non-black-box
reduction is provably necessary has been put forward as a desirable but elusive goal.5 For
some of the conjectured candidate examples, such as constructing “malicious OT” from “semi-
honest OT,” black-box constructions were subsequently found [35]. However, in recent years
several such provable examples emerged. We survey some of the most notable ones below.
Non-interactive commitments from OWFs: Mahmoody and Pass [48] showed that non-
interactive commitments cannot be constructed from so-called “hitting-OWFs” in a
black-box manner, even though a non-black-box construction was previously shown [10].
One nice feature of this example is that a non-interactive commitment is a very basic
primitive. However, in comparison hitting-OWFs have found little other applications in
cryptography. Furthermore, the separation here is intuitively weak since knowing the
circuit size of the OWF enables a black-box construction. This is contrasted with the
non-black-box constructions of 2-round MPC from OT [31, 13], which make an essential
use of the full code of the OT protocol.
5 The question is informal due to the subjective nature of the term “natural primitive.” It should not be
confused with the question of black-box vs. non-black-box simulation, for which Barak’s breakthrough
non-black-box simulation technique [8] gave the first such natural examples.
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Two-round OT extension: Beaver gave a construction of two-round OT extension [11]
making a non-black-box use of one-way functions. This construction can be cast in the
OT-hybrid model. However, very recently, Garg et al. [29] showed that a back-box variant
of such a constriction is impossible. They showed that such constructions are not possible
even when black-box use of a random oracle (and not just a one-way function) is allowed.
One limitation of this example is that the separation is only proved for protocols in the
OT-hybrid model.
IBE from CDH (or Generic Groups): In a recent result, Döttling and Garg [24] show that
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) can be realized under the Computational Diffie-Hellman
(CDH) assumption, while black-box constructions of the same had been previously ruled
out [15, 50]. However, in this case both the positive and the negative result use strong
“structured” primitives.
In another very related example, Döttling and Garg [23] showed a generic non-black-box
construction of hierarchical-IBE from IBE but we can expect a black-box impossibility
for the same using techniques from [15].6
Constructions of IO: In a very recent work, Garg et al. [30] showed that indistinguishability
obfuscation (IO) [27] cannot be constructed from compact functional encryption (FE) in
a black-box manner, even though non-black-constructions achieving this were already
known [14, 2].
Secret-Key FE vs Public-Key FE : In a recent work, Kitagawa et al. [45] showed that
public-key FE can be constructed from secret-key FE in a non-black-box manner, even
though black-box positive constructions had been previously ruled out [7].
In comparison with the above works, our main result has the advantage that it considers
two very natural and simple primitives. Our separation lives entirely in the “passive adversary”
world, and does not depend on the input domain being super-polynomial. For instance, our
separation is also meaningful for MPC with a uniform input distribution over a constant-size
domain. Thus, it is arguably similar in spirit to the Impagliazzo-Rudich separation of
key agreement from one-way functions [39], except that in the latter case no analogous
non-black-box construction is known.
1.3 Open Problems
While we settle the main open question concerning black-box round-optimal MPC, our work
leaves several interesting directions for future research. We highlight a few below, focusing
on our current setting of semi-honest security with no honest majority.
3-round MPC from black-box OT. Our main result rules out 2-round MPC protocols
making a black-box use of 2-round OT. On the other hand, a previous result of Ananth
et al. [1] shows that such 4-round protocols exist. What about 3-round protocols? In
the full version of the paper, we give evidence that extending our negative result to the
3-round case would require settling Question 6 in the negative. This barrier does not seem
to apply to 3-round protocols in which the first round messages do not depend on the
inputs, or alternatively 2-round protocols with a public-key infrastructure (PKI) setup.
Black-box use of stronger primitives. Can our negative result be bypassed by
replacing OT with stronger or more structured primitives? It is known that 2-round MPC
can make black-box use of different flavors of multi-key homomorphic encryption [49, 22]
6 Even though we expect such an impossibility to hold, we are not aware of a work that gives a full proof
of this claim.
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or homomorphic secret sharing [17, 18]. However, this is almost immediate from the
definitions of such primitives. Using simpler structured primitives, such as a “DDH-
hard” group or a generic group, we have black-box 2-round protocols that require a PKI
setup [28]. Can we get similar group-based constructions in the plain model? Alternatively,
can the separation be bypassed by using stronger variants of 2-round OT, such as OT
with high information rate [25] or OT with a stronger notion of receiver privacy [42]?
Minimal complete primitive for 2-round MPC. We have shown the existence of a
4-party functionality such that general MPC reduces to parallel calls to this functionality
without further interaction. We have also ruled out such a 2-party functionality. This
leaves open the 3-party case. As in the case of 3-round MPC from 2-round OT, we can
show that proving a negative result would require settling Question 6 in the negative.
Standard MPC vs. client-server MPC. Our main negative result automatically
carries over to the stronger client-server model for MPC, where n clients interact with n
servers who have no inputs or outputs. It is known that 2-round client-server MPC can
be constructed in a non-black-box way from standard 2-round MPC [28]. Whether such
a black-box construction exists remains open.
2 Technical Overview
In this section, we give a high-level overview of our techniques in proving the main result
(Theorem 4). To keep the exposition simple, we restrict ourselves to proving the impossibility
result for securely computing external-AND.
External-AND Functionality. Let us denote the three parties by (P1, P2, P3). The private
input of P1 is a bit x, the private input of P2 is a bit y and P3 does not have any private
inputs. The functionality f× outputs x · y to all the parties. Specifically, f×(x, y,⊥) = x · y.
Main Idea. To prove the impossibility result, we define a set of oracles such that 2-
round oblivious transfer exists with respect to these oracles, but there exists no 2-round,
semi-honest protocol for securely computing f×. This is sufficient to rule out a black-box
transformation from 2-round oblivious transfer to 2-round, 3-party semi-honest protocols
for general functionalities. Below, we describe these oracles (throughout this overview, sec
denotes the security parameter):
OT1 is a random length tripling function that takes in the receiver’s choice bit b ∈ {0, 1}
and its random tape r ∈ {0, 1}sec and outputs the receiver’s message otm1.
OT2 is a random length tripling function that takes in the receiver’s message otm1, the
sender’s inputs m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1}, its random tape s ∈ {0, 1}sec and outputs the sender’s
message otm2.
OT3 is a function that takes the transcript (otm1, otm2) along with (b, r) as input
and outputs mb if there exists unique (m0,m1, s) for which OT1(b, r) = otm1 and
OT2(otm1,m0,m1, s) = otm2. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
As observed by [37], the oracles (OT1,OT2,OT3) naturally give rise to a 2-round oblivious
transfer protocol. Specifically, letting b, r denote the input/randomness of the receiver, and
letting (m0,m1), s denote the input/randomness of the sender, the protocol proceeds as
follows: The receiver sends otm1 = OT1(b, r) to the sender, who responds with otm2 =
OT2(otm1,m0,m1, s), allowing the receiver to output the value OT3(otm1, otm2, b, r).
In this work, we prove that the existence of a 2-round protocol for external-AND w.r.t.
(OT1,OT2,OT3) implies a two-party protocol for computing g(x, y) = x · y in the random
oracle model. (Note that we start with a three-party protocol for an external functionality,
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and show a two-party protocol for a related functionality.) The existence of such two-party
protocol is known to be impossible [21, 46, 36, 47] and therefore the original protocol can
also not exist. This proves Theorem 8 discussed above, and implies Theorem 4 as a corollary.
Outline. The above result is proven using a sequence of transformations depicted in Figure 1.
2-round, 3-party protocol Π for f×
2-round, 2-party protocol Π for g with PDT
2-round protocol Π1 for g with PDT and no OT3 queries in generating the first message
2-round protocol Π2 for g with PDT and no OT3 queries in generating both the messages
Multi-round protocol Π∗ for g with PDT in RO model






Figure 1 Key Steps in the Proof. Here, PDT denotes publicly decodable transcript, g(x, y) = x ·y
and f×(x, y,⊥) = g(x, y).
Step-1: Publicly Decodable Transcript. Let Π be a 2-round protocol for securely comput-
ing f× w.r.t. (OT1,OT2,OT3). We first show that this implies a 2-round, 2-party protocol
Π for computing the two-party functionality g = g(x, y) = x · y, which has an additional
special property – the output is publicly decodable from the transcript. More formally, there
exists a deterministic algorithm Dec that computes the output of the functionality given the
transcript of the two-party protocol. In particular, if there exists a protocol Π that computes
g with publicly decodable transcript, then Dec on input T (which is the transcript of the
protocol Π) outputs g(x, y). In terms of security, Π is required to have the standard security
properties of a two-party (semi-honest) protocol, i.e., the corrupted party does not learn any
information about the other party’s input except the output.
To transform a 2-round protocol for f× into a 2-round protocol Π for g with publicly
decodable transcript, we use a player emulation technique.7 Concretely, we ask P1 to choose a
uniform random tape for P3 and send this random tape in the first round. Using this random
7 The idea of player emulation goes back to [19]; see also [38].
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tape, P1 and P2 can generate the messages P3 would have sent in the original protocol.
Additionally, P1 and P2 forwards all its outgoing messages that are sent to each other as
well the messages sent to P3 in the original protocol.
This protocol satisfies public decodability since given the transcript of the protocol (which
includes the entire view of P3 in the original protocol), one can run the output computing
algorithm of P3 to learn g(x, y). Further, the security follows directly from the security of
the original protocol when (P1, P3) and (P2, P3) are corrupted.8
Remaining Steps – Removing OT3 Queries. In the remainder of the proof, we show that
use of the oracle OT3 can be removed. More specifically, we show how to convert any
two-round two-party secure computation protocol Π with access to (OT1,OT2,OT3) and
publicly decodable transcript into a two-party protocol that computes the same functionality,
but with a few differences. The oracles OT3 will no longer be used in the new protocol, but
this will come at a cost, both in round-complexity and in security:
The round complexity of the protocol will grow by a polynomial factor (essentially upper
bounded by the query complexity of Dec).
The correctness and security guarantees will only be with respect to random inputs (we
call this “weak security”). One instructive way to think about weak security is to think
of a protocol between parties that have no input, and at the beginning of the execution
they sample a random input using their local random tape (or shared randomness) and
proceed to execute the protocol. Note that this makes simulation easier since we no
longer need to worry about consistency with an adversarially chosen (or sampled) input.
In other words, the new protocol Π∗ only makes queries to (OT1,OT2) which are essentially
random oracles. Therefore, Π∗ securely computes g in the random oracle model. However, it
follows from [36, 47] that such a protocol can be used to securely compute g in the information-
theoretic setting and this is known to be impossible for the AND functionality [21, 46] (even
with weak security as described above).
The remainder of the overview describes this transformation. We transform Π to Π∗
through a sequence of steps. We first transform Π to Π1 in which the first message function
of the protocol does not make any OT3 queries (Step 2 below). Then, we transform Π1 to
Π2 such that the first and second message functions of the protocol do not make any OT3
queries (Step 3 below). Finally, we transform Π2 to Π∗ such that the decoder Dec does not
make any OT3 queries (Step 4 below). It is the final step that incurs the blow-up in the
round complexity. Additional details follow.
Step-2: Π⇒ Π1. The first message function of Π has access to (OT1,OT2,OT3) oracles
and may make multiple queries to all of them. In order to perform this transformation, we
devise a mechanism to emulate the OT3 oracle without making actual queries to it. Recall
that any query to the OT3 oracle contains ((otm1, otm2), (b, r)) and it outputs mb if and only
if there exists (m0,m1, s) for which OT1(b, r) = otm1 and OT2(otm1,m0,m1, s) = otm2. The
first step of the OT3 oracle is easy to emulate; we can query OT1 on (b, r) and check if the
output is otm1. To emulate the second step, we maintain a list of all the queries/responses
made by the first message function to OT2. If we find an entry (otm1,m0,m1, s, otm2) in
this list, we output mb; else, we output ⊥. Note that since OT2 is length tripling, it is
8 It is easy to see that the security of the transformed protocol requires security against collusion of P1, P3
since P1 has the entire view of P3. We also require security against (P2, P3) collusion since P1 forwards
all its messages sent to P3 in the second-round of the protocol.
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injective with overwhelming probability. Thus, if we find such an entry then our emulation
is correct. On the other hand, if we don’t find such an entry, we output ⊥ and it can be
easily shown that the original oracle also outputs ⊥ except with negligible probability. Thus,
our emulation is statistically close to the real oracle.
Step-3: Π1 ⇒ Π2. It might be tempting to conclude that a similar strategy as before
should work even for OT3 queries made in the second round. That is, maintain the list
of queries to the OT2 oracle and when the second message function makes an OT3 query,
check if there is entry in this list with the response equal to otm2. If such an entry is found,
output the corresponding mb; else, output ⊥. This strategy fails because in the second round
it is possible that the relevant OT2 query was made by the other party and therefore it
is not possible for each party to only consider the list of OT2 queries made locally. Note,
however, that only one simultanous round of communication has been made by the parties
so far. Therefore, it must be the case that the party that made the OT2 query also made the
respective OT1 query.
To take care of such queries, that we call “correlated queries”, we modify the first round
of Π1 as follows. The parties will prepare an additional list L that contains all correlated
queries that are “likely” to be asked by the other party. (No OT3 calls will be made while
preparing this list.)
The parties will now send this list L along with the first round message of Π1. Now,
when the second message function of a party in Π1 attempts to make an OT3 query on
(otm1, otm2, (b, r)), we first check if otm1 is valid (by querying OT1) and then answer this
query as follows. If otm2 is a result of a local query then find the response using the list of
local queries/responses. If otm2 is a correlated query, use the list L sent by the other party
to answer. If we don’t find any entry in the local list or the correlated list, we output ⊥. We
show that with overwhelming probability, the real oracle also outputs ⊥ in this case. We
also prove that sending this additional list of “likely” correlated queries does not harm the
security of Π2.
To conclude, we describe how the list L is generated, say by P1. Note that the list needs
to be generated at a point where P1 already decided on its first Π1 message; now it just
needs to come up with L. To this end, P1 executes many copies of Π1 executions of P2, each
time with fresh randomness and random input. Then the list L contains the responses to the
list of all correlated OT2 queries, i.e., the valid queries made to OT3 by “virtual” P2 such
that both OT1 and OT2 have been generated by P1. This will allow to preserve correctness
on an average input, and does not violate privacy since given the first Π1 messages, anyone
can sample such executions.
Step-4: Π2 ⇒ Π∗. At the end of step-3, we have a protocol where the first and the second
message functions do not make any queries to the OT3 oracle. However, for the parties to
learn the output, they must run the decoder Dec on the transcript, and this decoder might
make queries to OT3. Recall that Dec is a deterministic decoding function whose input is
the transcript of the interaction. Further recall that Π∗ will be a protocol that does not use
OT3 but will have many communication rounds.
In Π∗, the parties will first execute the two rounds of Π2 to obtain a transcript. Then
they will jointly execute the decoder, where for each OT3 query that the decoder needs to
make, the party that made the relevant OT2 query will “help out” by sending the decoding
value to the other party. This will proceed for as many rounds as the number of queries that
Dec needs to make, but eventually it will allow both parties to complete the execution of
Dec locally and compute the output of the functionality. We will then need to show that
privacy is not harmed in this process. Details follow.
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Let us go back to the point where both parties finished executing the two rounds of
Π2 now wish to engage in joint decoding. One of the parties, say P1, starts running the
decoder on the transcript, and along the way maintain the list of OT1,OT2 made in this
process. When the decoder attempts to make an OT3 query on input ((otm1, otm2), (b, r)),
P1 checks if otm1 is valid (by making a query to OT1). It then checks if there is an entry
(otm1,m0,m1, s, otm2) in the list of OT2 queries made by the decoder and in the case such
an entry is found, it answers with mb. If such an entry is not found, P1 checks its local list
of queries/responses made to OT2 during the generation of the first two messages. If it finds
an entry (otm1,m0,m1, s, otm2) in that list, it answers with mb. If even this list does not
contain an entry, there are 3 possibilities.
1. otm2 is not in the image of OT2 oracle in which case P1 has to output ⊥.
2. otm2 is in the image of OT2 oracle and P2 has made this query.
3. otm2 is in the image of OT2 oracle and P2 has not made this query.
The probability that case-3 happens can be shown to be negligible for similar reasons to ones
discussed above: if neither party made the relevant OT2 query then the value otm2 is almost
surely invalid. Thus, P1 must decide whether it is in case-1 or case-2 and if it is in case-2, it
must give the corresponding mb. To accomplish this, P1 sends a message to P2 with (b, otm2)
and asks P2 to see if there is an entry of the form (otm1,m0,m1, s, otm2) in its local list of
queries to OT2 oracle. If yes, P2 responds with mb; else, it responds with ⊥. P1 just gives
P2’s message as the corresponding response to that query. This blows up the number of
rounds of the protocol Π∗ proportional to the number of queries made by the decoder.
Observe that Π∗ does not make any queries to the OT3 oracle. At the end, P1 learns
the output g(x, y) and it can send this as the last round message to P2. Thus, Π∗ also has
publicly decodable transcript. The correctness of this transformation directly follows since
we prove that case-3 happens with negligible probability and if OT2 is injective (which occurs
with overwhelming probability), it follows that if an entry is found in either of the lists of the
two parties or on the local list of the decoder, the response given by the emulation is correct.
To see why this transformation is secure, notice that the query ((otm1, otm2), (b, r)) is
made by the Dec by just looking at the transcript. Hence, there is no harm in P1 sending
(b, otm2) to the other party. Similarly, if P2 has indeed made a query to OT2 such that the
response obtained is otm2, it should follow from the security of Π2 that the P2’s privacy
is not affected if it sends mb to P1. Indeed, this information is efficiently learnable given
the transcript and an access to the OT3 oracle. However, there is a subtle issue with this
argument which we elaborate next.
Problem of Intersecting Queries. A subtle issue arises when we try to formally reduce the
security of Π∗ to the security of Π2. To illustrate this, let us assume the case where P2 is
corrupted. To get a reduction to the security of Π2, we must give an algorithm that takes
the view of P2 in Π2 and efficiently generates the view of P2 in Π∗. In particular, it must
generate the additional messages in Π∗ given only the view of P2 in Π2. This algorithm is
allowed to make OT3 queries as we are trying to give a reduction to the security of Π2. For
the sake of illustration, assume that the Dec makes a single OT3 query. A natural approach
for this algorithm is to take the transcript available in the view of P2 and start running the
decoder on the transcript. When the decoder makes an OT3 query, the algorithm uses the
real OT3 oracle to respond to this query. However, notice that the algorithm must generate
the messages that correspond to answering this OT3 query in Π∗. Recall that in Π∗, P1 first
checks in its local list whether there an entry of the form (otm1,m0,m1, s, otm2), and only
if such an entry is not found, P1 sends the message (b, otm2) to P2. Thus, to generate the
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transcript of Π∗, the algorithm must somehow decide whether P1 would find this entry in its
local list or not. However, the algorithm is only given the view of P2 and does not have any
information about the queries that P1 has made to OT2.
We see that the problem arises when there is an OT2 query that potentially was made
by both parties. To handle this issue, we resort to the notion of intersection queries taken
from the key-agreement impossibility result [39, 9]. These works show that it is possible,
in polynomial time, to recover a superset of all oracle queries made by both parties (with
all but small probability). Given this algorithm, we modify the transformation as follows.
The parties will first run the two rounds of communication of Π2. Then they will run the
intersection query finder to recover the intersection query superset. We assume for the
purpose of this outline this process is deterministic.9 Now, upon each potential OT3 query
of the decoder, P1 will look for the preimage query not only in its query history, but also in
the superset of intersection queries, and send a message to P2 only if the preimage is found
in either of this. In particular this means that if the preimage is in the intersection query
superset, then we are guaranteed that P1 will not send a message.
The above modified protocol can be efficiently simulated, since the simulator can also
run the intersection query finder and recover the same superset as the parties. Now, if OT3
gives a valid answer, the simulator looks for a preimage in the intersection query superset. If
it finds one, then it concludes that P1 will not send any message to P2. If not, then it knows
that (except with small probability) exactly one of the parties made the preimage query, and
it furthermore knows the internal state of one of the parties, so it knows whether this party
made the preimage query. This allows the simulator to always deduce which is the party
that made the preimage query and simulate appropriately.
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